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RECENT CASES
SALES-MANUFACTURED

BY OR MANUFACTURED FOR

A recent decision of the Vermont Supreme Court, H. W. Myers and Son,
Inc. v. Felopulos,1 considers the question whether the formalities required by
the Statute of Frauds section 2 of the Uniform Sales Act must be observed in the
case of a contract by the terms of which the seller is to procure to be made goods
especially manufactured for the buyer and not suitable for sale to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business. The Sales Act provides, § 4 (2):
"but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for the
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
selier's business, the provisions of this section shall not apply."
Does this mean that a contract is excluded only if the seller himself is to do the
manufacturing?
The facts of the Felopulos8 case were these: the seller contracted to supply
the buyer with kitchen cabinets especially designed to the buyer's specifications
and not suitable for sale in the ordinary course of the seller's business; in pursuance of this oral agreement the seller had a third party manufacture the special
kitchen cabinets to the buyer's order, and then the buyer refused to receive the
merchandise from the seller; the lower court held the contract to be outside the
Statute of Frauds which was reversed on appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont
stating,
"inasmuch as the goods were not manufactured by the seller but were
to be procured by the seller to be manfuactured by another the contract
comes within the Statute of Frauds."
Prior to the Sales Act, courts had developed three rules distinguishing between sales of and contracts to sell goods, on the one hand, and contracts for work,
labor, and services on the other, the latter requiring no particular formality
for enforceability, whereas the former were governed by § 17 of the English
Statute of Frauds 4 which was in substance adopted by a majority of the states.
The English view, which found little support in the United States,5 was established
in Lee v. Griffin;6 the seller was a dentist who contracted to manufacture for the
buyer a set of false teeth designed to the buyer's order, and Blackburn, J., said,
in holding the contract to be a sale of goods,

1 76 A.2d 552 (1950).
2 § 4 (2).
a See footnote 1.
4 29 Chas. I, c. 3 § 17 (1677).

9 pratt v. Miller, 109 Mo. 78, isS. W. 965 (1892) approves the English rule.
6 1 Best and S. 272 (1861).
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"if the contract be such that, when carried out, it would result in the
sale of a chattel, the party cannot sue for work and labor; but if the result
of the contract is that the party has done work and labor which ends
in nothing that can become the subject of a sale, the party cannot sue for
goods sold and delivered."
New York, prior to the passage of the Sales Act, took the opposite extreme
from the view of the English Courts, in Sewall v. Fitch,1 involving a contract
by defendant to sell 300 kegs of nails of a specified kind. The defendant had no
nails at hand but was to manufacture them. The court held that this contract
did not need to be in writing, as it was not a contract for the sale of goods but
one for work and labor. Therefore the New York rule appeared to be that a
contract of sale within the Statute of Frauds must involve a transfer, whether
immediately or in the future, of a chattel in existence at the time of contract, although something remained to be done to the goods before they were in a deliverable condition.
The Massachusetts rule was first laid down by Shaw, C. J., in Mixer v.
Howarth,s then by Ames, J., in Goddard v. Binney,9 the two leading cases. In
the latter case the defendant ordered a buggy of the seller and gave directions
that the color of the lining be drab, and the outside seat of cane, that the
vehicle be painted in a certain way, and also that the buggy was to have on it
his monogram and initials. Plaintiff made every piece as ordered and claimed
recovery on the basis of work and labor on a chattel not intended or adapted
for the general market. Judge Ames said,
"that a contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such as the
vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures
for the general market, whether on hand at the time or not, is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the statute applies. But on the other
hand, if the goods are to be manufactured especially for the purchaser,
and upon his special order, and not for the general market, the case
is not within the statute."
§ 4 (2) of the Sales Act is usually regarded as having adopted the Massachusetts rule. The case law of Massachusetts prior to the Sales Act held that
contracts where the seller was to procure the manufacture of the goods were within
the Statute of Frauds. In the case of Smalley v. HamblinY' the seller was a dealer
in bottles, who procured specially designed bottles to the purchaser's order. The
bottles were manufactured by a third person, and the court held this oral contract
unenforceable, since the Statute of Frauds had not been satisfied.
This rule can be supported if it be conceded that the exception of § 4 (2)
is made because contracts within the exception are contracts for work and labor
7 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 215 (1828); Parson v. Loucks, 48 N. Y. 17, 8 Am. Rep. 517 (1871); Cooke
v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. Rep. 619 (1875).
& 21 Pick. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 256 (Mass. 1839).
9 115 Mass. 450, 15 Am. Rep. 112 (1874) ; Uniform Sales Act § 4 (2).
10 Smalley v. Hamblin, 170 Mass. 380, 49 N. E. 626 (1898). See also 165 Mass. 115, 42 N. E. 497

(1896).
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and do not involve a sale of goods, because in fact the seller is merely contracting
to transfer or supply the buyer with a chattel; ther'efore the seller is not manufacturing anything for the buyer nor is he performing work or labor for the
buyer; he is selling merchandise, and that is the view taken by the Felopulos cask.
In the Febopulos case the Vermont Court repudiated its pre-Sales Act case
law of Forsyth v. Mann," in which defendants agreed to furnish a monument for

a certain amount, to be erected by a state on a battlefield. That was held not a
contract for the sale of goods, within the Statute of Frauds, though defendants
were not bound to bestow their personal skill and labor thereon, but could get
others to make it for them.
The courts add, as a further reason for drawing the distinction between
goods manufactured by the seller and goods procured by the seller for the buyer,
that judicial construction of the Sales Act requires that every word be interpreted
so as to be given effect. 12 It is argued that if the drafters of the Sales Act
had intended to include goods manufactured for the seller they would have
specified that contingency. It is pointed out that § 5 of the act expressly mentions
goods acquired by the seller; therefore the failure to mention such a situation in
§ 4 (2) shows impliedly that § 4 (2) was not intended to extend that far.
Although the Sales Act adopts the basic distinction of the Massachusetts rule,
it does not necessarily follow that all the details of the Massachusetts rule, as
adopted by their courts was intended to be followed. It is questionable whether
§ 4 (2) was intended to draw the line between contracts involving the sale of
goods and contracts for work and labor. Does the fact that the seller is to manufacture the goods especially for the buyer show that the buyer was contracting
for the seller's work and labor, rather than the resulting chattel? It may be doubted
that the price is paid for the labor and work rather than the transfer of ownership.
Professor Williston suggests,"
"that though a contract for goods to be made to order may not be a contract for a sale within the meaning of the statute of frauds if it is
contemplated that special work and labor by the seller shall go into
it, it is, nevertheless, a contract of sale for other purposes. There can,
in fact, be no doubt that the price is promised for the completed article,
not for the work and materials which have gone into its manufacture."
Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the exception of § 4 (2) was made
because of the lessened likelihood of perjury in this case, and the increased likelihood of prejudice to the seller if he is unable to enforce an oral contract, rather
than because a contract within the exception of § 4 (2) is a contract for work
and labor? The result of this premise manifests the injustice done if we allow a
manufacturer-seller to recover on an oral contract and preclude the seller who
11

68 Vt. 116, 34 A. 481 (1896).
12 Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15, 136 N. E. 107 (1922).

13 WUuISTON ON SALEs, Rev. Ed., § 563 (1948).
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procures the manufacture of special goods from recovery. It must be conceded,
however, that the weight of authority appears to be that § 4 (2) was drafted to
distinguish between contracts for work and labor from contracts to sell or the
sale of goods.
The danger of fraud by perjured testimony is no greater where the seller
has the goods made than where the seller manufactures the goods himself.
Considering the present day separation of manufacturer and consumer through
intermediate wholesalers and retailers it seems an unnecessary prejudice upon the
seller who procures the manufacture of special goods to make him comply with
the Statute of Frauds and permit the seller-manufacturer to contract orally. The
distinction seems artificial and not worthy of application.
The Uniform Commercial Code (Proposed Final Draft 1950) § 2-201 (3,a),
provides,
(3) A contract valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be especially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of
the seller's business and the seller, under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has before notice
of repudiation made a substantial beginning of their manufacture
or has made commitments for their procurement;"
This would allow the seller who procures the manufacture of special goods
to recover on his oral contract.
However, the weight of authority distinguishes between contracts to manufacture by the seller and contracts to procure to be manufactured by the seller
of which the Felopulos case is the latest authority. New York prior to adopting
the Sales Act held the case was outside the Statute of Frauds even though a third
party was to manufacture a belt for the seller in Morse v. Canasawacta Knitting
Co.," but following the enactment of the Sales Act New York reversed this
decision in Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-McQuade Co.,15 and confirmed the
Massachusetts view. The leading case in point upon which recent decisions rely
is Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal 6 cited as authorative in the Felopulos case.
Conclusion
The question whether a contract whereby the seller agrees to procure special
goods for the buyer is within the Statute of Frauds has not been decided in Pennsylvania. It is suggested that the Pennsylvania courts might well take the view
that there is no distinction between contracts to manufacture and contracts to
have manufactured special goods for the buyer, and both are within the exception
of the Sales Act § 4 (2).
Russell F. Griest
14 154 App. Div. 351, 139 N. Y. Supp. 634 (1912).
15 99 Misc. Rep. 508, 164 N. Y. Supp. 201 (1917);

Rev. Ed., § 55 (1948).
16 Supia, note 11.

for a discussion see, 1 WILLISTON
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PATENTABILITY OF COMBINATIONS-TWO COURT RULECONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Two interesting problems were developed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the
recent case of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp. et a. 1
The respondents had brought this action against appellants for infringement
of patent rights owned by them. The device in question was the three-sided bottomless wooden rack used at the checker's counter in supermarkets to move articles
purchased from one end of the counter to a point more convenient for the checker
to perform his duties.
The District Court had found that this device came within the patent law
requirements as a new and useful combination. 2 The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this finding as substantiated by the evidence and not clearly erroneous.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether or not the
District Court had applied the correct criteria for invention.
The District Court admitted that most of the elements of this device were
known to prior art but said that the idea of a counter with an extension to receive
this three-sided tray was a new feature and constituted a new and useful combination.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, concludes that the lower courts erred.
Three reasons were given for this conclusion. First, said the Court, this extension
(which was the critical element in the device) was not even mentioned, unless
by implication, in the application for the patent. This amounted to a technical
violation of the law. 3 But even had it been mentioned, the change in dimensions of
a merchant's counter could hardly be classified as an invention. Finally, even if
the extension could be classified as a patentable improvement, the Court says this
is not enough unless the old elements plus the extension combine to form a new
combination.
The question upon which the case turned was the test to be used for combination patents. The evolution of the rules governing the patentability of combinations left much to be desired. Therefore, this case should be a guidepost in the future
for what had hitherto been a rather blurred highway.
Preliminarily it may be said that it was never enough that the applicant
alleged that his combination was patentable nor did the fact that the officer issuing
the patent believed that the combination was patentable make it such. The issuing
of the patent amounts to a prima facie right only. The device must in fact possess
1 71 S. Ct. 127 (1950).

2 78 F. Supp. 388.
s 35 U. S. C. A. Sec. 33.
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the requisites. Thus, the validity of the patent is always subject to examination
by the courts.'
Through the years various tests had been used by the court in determining
the patentability of a combination. One of the earliest tests was whether the combination of devices produced a new result.6 Something a little more specific was
employed later when the Court said that even though the result achieved by the
combination was now quite obvious, the mere fact that "it took so long for someone to achieve the result makes it apparent that it was not such an obvious
thing and therefore a product of inventive genius. 6 Later, the Court went back
to the "new result" test saying that, "The mere multiplicity of elements does not
make (a combination) patentable." In McClain v. Ortmayerg the Court said
this was a question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition. By dicta, the Court in the latter case said the fact that the patented
article had gone into general use was evidence of its utility, but not of its patentable novelty.
Probably the most detailed test was that used to sustain the patentability of
a combination used for the improvement of the Fourdrinier paper-making machine.9 The objection was raised here that the device was not patentable because
the improvement was for the same general purpose. The Court disagreed. The
test used here was as follows:
"The fact that in a decade of eager quest for higher speeds this important
chain of circumstances had escaped observation, the fact that no one had
applied a remedy for the consequent trouble until Eibel, and the fact that
when made known, all adopted his remedy, leaves no doubt in our minds
that what he saw and did was not obvious and did involve discovery and
invention."
This triple test repudiates the dicta in the McClain case and combines two tests
already in use. Thd language of the Court implies here, however, that all three
requisites must be met.
In the present case, Justice Jackson sets out what the Court defines as a clear
test, to wit,
"The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts
is the accumulation of old devices patentable."
4 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, 23 L. Ed. 719 (1875).

S Reckendorfer v. Faber (supra).
6 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 103 U. S. 580, 26 L. Ed. 1177 (1881). Applicant here took all that
was known about looms and combined it with the advantages of A's rigid lathe (divested of some
of its defects) and his constant command of the wire, with B's trough or wire bar for supporting
the wire. As a result, the looms gave 50 yards a day rather than 40.
7 Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 299, 15 S.Ct. 931, 39 L. Ed. 991 (1894).
8 141 U. S.419, 35 L. Ed. 800 (1891). Here the Court refused to allow a patent for a combination
of sweat pads with horse collars!
6 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45, 43 S. Ct. 322 (1922).
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Or, as is later implied, the sum of two and two must now total more than
four. The express exception to this test is made in the case of chemicals or electronics where it is admitted that the mere concert of the elements may take on some
new function. But where the combination is mechanical, the severe test will be
applied.
Applying this test to the counter extension end rack, the Court readily connew had been added. To some, this may have shades of the
cluded that nothing
"new result" test'0 used early in the Court's decisions. However, Justice Jackson
insists this is the first time the Court has expressly adopted a practical test for the
patentability of combinations.
The second problem with which the Court dealt in this case was the "two court
rule." As has been stated, both the District and Circuit Courts had found this
combination to be patentable. Under the two court rule, a court of law cannot
undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence
of exceptional error.'" But Justice Jackson says that the court here is setting aside
no finding of fact (except as to the table extension which was wrong as a matter
of law) but rather is reversing the lower courts because the wrong test was used.
To the constitutional law student, the concurring opinion is much more satisfactory. As to the test, or patentability for combinations, Justices Douglas and
Black point to the Constitution as the test. 12 "The standard of patentability is a
constitutional standard," states Justice Douglas. If the combination does not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, it is not patentable. Such a citation is remarkable and to be commended.
Regarding the two court rule, the concurring Justices contend that it ought
to have no place in patent law at all, since the test for patentability is a constitutional provision. On its face the argument appears sound but surely it cannot be said
the Court will always reject the two court rule where constitutional provisions
are being applied!
The conclusions of the Court both as to the test for patentability of combinations and the effect of the two court rule in patent law should fulfill a much needed
refinement in the law. The concurring opinion is particularly noteworthy in its
citation of the Constitution in the field of patent law, something which has
been long overlooked.
John A. MacPhail

10 Supra.
11 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Inde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271, 69 S. Ct. 535, 93 L. Ed. 672

Ji948).
2 Art. 2, Sec. 8.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INTENT IN THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY
MURDER DOCTRINE
In Com. v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401 (1951) the defendant was
indicted for murder and was convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal he
complained that the trial judge had charged the jury in effect that where murder
is committed in the perpetration of a robbery, it is murder in the first degree,
irrespective of intent, and, therefore, the fact that the defendant had been drinking to excess had no legal significance or bearing upon the degree of his guilt.
The conviction was sustained.
A person who kills in the perpetration of robbery is guilty of murder in the
tirst degree irrespective of any intent to kill but he must have the intent which is
an essential element of robbery and, therefore, if by reason of intoxication he has
not such intent, he is not guilty of robbery, and his conviction of murder in the
first degree cannot be predicated upon the assumption that he is.
Where a prosecution for murder is based on the theory that death was caused
ty the defendant while was committing a felony involving a specific intent, (as
e.g., robbery) the defendant may show that by reason of intoxication he could
not have had such intent and, therefore, was not guilty of murder, or, consequently,
murder in the first degree. People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 155.
See 23 ILL. L. R~v. 159.

